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AESTHETIC AUTONOMY 
AND THE CRISIS OF THEORY: 
GREENBERG, ADORNO, AND 
THE PROBLEM OF POSTMODERNISM 
IN THE VISUAL ARTS 
As is clearly inscribed in the very term 'postmodern', any position defining 
itself as such is, by definition, a position on the modern - a postmodern 
vision cannot be a solely prospective one, it is necessarily also a retrospective 
one. 
(Victor Burgin, 'The end of art theory') 
I THE PROBLEM OF A CONTEMPORARY AESTHETIC 
If aesthetic theory has substance only to the extent to which it reflects the 
historical development of its subject,1 it is, I think, fair to say that there is at 
present no satisfactory contemporary aesthetic of the visual arts. Both the 
sheer formal diversity of the art of the last twenty years and certain of the 
unifying tendencies which it has none the less come to display, have so 
undermined the basic presuppositions and parameters of judgement of the 
aesthetics of modernism as to throw into doubt, not merely the continuing 
validity of this aesthetic as an historically specific manifestation of the aesthetic 
theory of modernity, but the very idea of 'aesthetics' itself as an independent 
or autonomous theoretical sphere. Aesthetic theory, it is increasingly 
suggested, at least in the form in which it existed from the Enlightenment up 
until its culmination in the high modernist formalism of the 1950s and early 
1960s, is at an end.2 Current aesthetic theory registers its contemporaneity 
through its crisis. 
The form in which this crisis manifests itself is, however, paradoxically that 
of a massive inflation of theoretical writing about art. The less sure of itself 
aesthetics has become, the more it has come to manifest this insecurity in the 
form of a search for objectivity, the possibility of which would seem to be 
denied by the very instability of its object (contemporary art). The range and 
vitality of current aesthetic debate has come to mimic the apparently infinite 
formal possibilities of the 'post-avant-gardist' art which it seeks to comprehend. 
Aesthetic theory, it would seem, is in danger of becoming 'aestheticized' at 
precisely the moment at which it is no longer able, theoretically, to sustain any 
such notion.3 
The source of this crisis is, of course, the crisis of modernism itself: the 
apparent exhaustion of that last bastion of aesthetic traditionalism, the 
'tradition of overthrowing tradition' (Rosenberg):4 the self-annihilation of the 
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'culture of negation' (Poggioli).5 Its putative resolution, the idea of ' pos t -
modernism - that 'first glimpse of the historical emergence of a field of post-
Romantic aesthetics'6 - involves, in this respect, a reorientation towards, if not 
a recuperation of, tradition.7 Yet, as the studied ambivalence of Rosenberg's 
description of modernism suggests, the relation of this reorientation to 
modernism itself remains unclear. For modernism is, in its own peculiar, 
relentlessly restless way, itself a tradition. It is for this reason that Jencks, for 
example, insists on the definition of postmodernism as at once ' the 
continuation of Modernism and its transcendence'.8 
In what sense, though, is modernism a tradition? What is the relation of the 
so-called 'postmodernist ' reorientation of art towards tradition to the 
relationship between modernism and tradition? And what are its implications 
for the idea of a specifically 'aesthetic' theory? It is at this point that matters 
begin to become rather more complicated. For it is clear from even a cursory 
glance at Jencks's writings on postmodernism, for example, that those 
elements of the 'modern ' (the slippage has already begun) which, he argues, 
continue to characterize the 'postmodern' are defined primarily at the level of 
technique, of style, and, more generally, of 'sensibility'. When the question of 
the transcendence of modernism by postmodernism is at stake, however, an 
entirely different and much wider conception of modernism is deployed within 
his work: a conception of modernism as a whole cultural project, with its own 
distinctive orientation towards society and towards history: a distinctive 
conception not only of aesthetic form, but of the place and function of art 
within society as well.10 At times (most notably in his attempts to distinguish 
postmodernism from late modernism on the one hand, and from a more 
straightforward revival of tradition on the other) Jencks not only acknowledges 
but insists upon the fact that modernism cannot be defined merely 
stylistically.11 Elsewhere, however, he is far less clear about the matter. For it 
remains obscure in what sense the 'modern' is to manifest itself within the 
'postmodern' other than stylistically - albeit as a part of a wider repertoire of 
styles, coexisting side by side in the new, hybridized language of postmodernist 
eclecticism.12 Yet if this is all there is to the continuity between modernism 
and postmodernism, then the former is reduced, in its relationship to the 
latter, to the status of a tradition like any other. The complexity, the creativity, 
and the deeply contradictory character of the relationship between modernism 
and tradition is not so much suppressed by this move as completely effaced. 
The problem of the dialectical continuity of modernism which Jencks, like so 
many others, had set out to resolve, is simply abandoned; left behind in the 
rush for a convincing taxonomy of styles. 
There is a fatal disjunction between the terms of the 'double-coding' 
(continuation and transcendence) which stands at the core of Jencks's 
conception of postmodernism. The confusions of his conception are, however, 
instructive. For they are symptomatic of a wider problem, the ramifications of 
which extend into the farthest corners of current aesthetic debates. This is the 
problem of the relationship between two quite distinct, if none the less 
interconnected conceptions of modernism: a stylistic, formalistic, or what 
might be called an 'art-historical' conception of modernism, derived in the 
32 NEW FORMATIONS 
most part, within the visual arts, from the work of Clement Greenberg; and a 
far wider (socio-cultural) and deeper (aesthetico-philosophical) conception of 
modernism, such as is to be found, for example, in the work of the Frankfurt 
school and other theorists from within the German tradition. It is, I shall 
argue, in the constant and systematic privileging of the first of these two 
conceptions over the second in the attempt to theorize a concept of 
postmodernism for the visual arts that much of both the mystery and the 
intractability of the problem of postmodernism (and thereby of the problem of 
the possibility and form of a contemporary aesthetic theory) lie. The problem 
derives from the hegemonic status of Greenberg's conception of modernism 
within the art world of the 1960s. 
2 THE REACTION TO GREENBERG 
For those working within, yet at the margins of, the art establishment in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, it was Greenberg and all that he stood for that was 
the enemy. It is in terms of a repudiation of his work, and of the kind of art 
for which it stands, that much of both the art and the art theory produced 
since the mid-1960s is to be understood.13 It is primarily in opposition to 
Greenberg's conception of modernism that the idea of postmodernism has 
evolved in the visual arts. When Victor Burgin writes of the conceptualism of 
the late 1960s as 'a revolt against modernism - specifically, we should add, as 
formulated in the writings of the American critic Clement Greenberg'14 - he 
speaks for a generation of artists and critics. And he continues to speak for this 
generation (particularly for other artist-critics) when, in opposition to the self-
referential autonomy of Greenberg's aesthetics, he offers instead a 'politics of 
representation' within which the 'aesthetic', the art object as traditionally 
construed, is to be considered simply as one medium among others (and an 
increasingly sterile one at that) for the deployment of a variety of 
representational strategies, the logic of which is to derive less from the 
specificity of the chosen medium than from a general semiotic theory of 
representation within the terms of which, it is argued, all meaning is to be 
construed.15 Art practice, it is increasingly suggested, is to be seen as 'a set of 
operations performed in a field of signifying practices, perhaps centred on a 
medium but certainly not bounded by it'.16 It is this whole 'set of ooerations', 
it is argued, which must become the object of analysis and judgement, rather 
than their mere result, the art 'object' as it has been traditionally understood. 
The very idea of the art 'object', it is insisted, requires reconceptualization if 
current artistic practices are to be understood - a reconceptualization which 
would place it beyond the bounds of 'aesthetic' theory as such. 
What is at issue in these debates is Greenberg's insistence on the traditional 
specificity of the aesthetic object, his imperative to the artist to develop the 
work out of the immanent formal properties of the medium, and the 
consequent self-enclosed, self-referential autonomy of the 'high' modernist 
work itself.17 It is this inherent tendency towards self-referentiality within the 
late modernist work which was the main object of attack for all those artists 
and critics who attempted to move beyond Greenbergian modernism from the 
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mid-1960s onwards, for two main reasons. One was immanently aesthetic, the 
other more explicitly social or ideological. On the one hand, there was a 
growing awareness of the inherently degenerative character of the high 
modernist tradition: the kenosis or 'self-emptying' character of a tradition 
within which new content has to be constantly generated from the formal 
properties of the aesthetic medium alone.18 On the other hand, there was a 
growing political reaction to the increasing social conservatism of a formalistic 
art the original critical dimension of which had long ago been negated by its 
canonization within the major art institutions of western states.19 
The aesthetic form of the reaction to this situation was immensely varied -
ranging from conceptualism's direct attack on the idea of the art object 
(Burgin's 'absence of presence'), through an increasing use of new and 
particularly 'mixed' media (including, especially, photography and other 
'mass' media), the direct reinstatement of social and political representational 
content into the work, and the reintroduction of traditional, art historical 
iconographic material (usually in a deliberately hybrid, ironic, or parodic 
fashion), to straightforward repetitions of the 'historical' avant-garde's internal 
attack upon the art institution itself, through the simple designation of 
everyday, mass-produced commodities as aesthetic objects in their own right. 
It is this plurality of new artistic forms and strategies which has caused such a 
problem for aesthetic theory since the 1960s. And it is primarily because of its 
pretension to cope with this plurality, indeed, to theorize it, that the idea of 
postmodernism has enjoyed such enormous popularity over the last few years. 
Indeed, postmodernism may be seen, in this respect, as Peter Burger has 
suggested, as the basis for an aspiring new academicism.20 
A number of things should be noted about the explosion of a multiplicity of 
new artistic forms in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the first place, there 
Victor Burgin: from Olympia (1982). 
Victor Burgin: from Office at Night (7 panels, 1985) 
was a particularly dynamic interaction during this period between artistic 
practices and the new theoretical discourses which were being developed to 
understand them, such that these discourses were themselves increasingly 
used, not merely as an essential part of the means of artistic production 
(something which has always been the case), but as an essential part of the art 
practice or 'object' itself as well.21 Secondly, there was a growth of organic 
links between certain of these new artistic and theoretical developments and 
those social movements (particularly the women's movement) which were 
emerging or re-emerging at the time.22 Finally, there were a number of 
important developments taking place within the social relations of the art 
institution itself, in terms of its twin relations to the market and to the state. A 
massive growth in multinational corporate investment in the arts, the 
emergence of new 'mass' styles of exhibiting and marketing by the national 
institutions of western states (led, symptomatically, by the Museum of Modern 
Art in New York), and the expansion and transformation of art school 
education, should all be mentioned in this regard.23 These latter developments, 
moreover, all took place in close, if often contradictory relationships with the 
development of the new art practices themselves. 
All of this has produced enormous, if not insurmountable, complications for 
attempts to reimpose a unity, at the level of a specifically 'aesthetic' theory, 
upon the field of contemporary artistic production. In response to these 
difficulties, critics have tended either to give up the attempt as in principle 
misguided (the 'end of art theory' theory), or to reimpose normative standards 
of aesthetic judgement which exclude vast tracts of contemporary artistic 
production from the sphere of 'aesthetics', and hence of genuine artistic value 
altogether (the return to tradition). The idea of postmodernism straddles the 
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gap between these two equally unsatisfactory alternatives. Yet, as it stands, 
this idea remains as theoretically eclectic as the art which it pertains to 
comprehend is aesthetically hybrid; more of a symptom of the limits of a 
certain discourse on modernism than a resolution to the problem of its 
continuing applicability.24 
One of the main problems here, I want to suggest, lies in the running 
together of two quite distinct conceptions of aesthetic autonomy in Greenberg's 
work, along with the total neglect of a third; and a consequent failure on the 
part of proponents of postmodernism to distinguish between the various 
different ways in which work produced in reaction to Greenbergian 
modernism challenges the 'autonomy' of the 'high' or late modernist work. 
Furthermore, I want to suggest, just as it is only in Adorno's work that one 
can find something approaching an adequate conceptualization of the multiple 
senses of the autonomy of the modernist work, so it is only through a 
systematic application of the categories of his aesthetic theory to the 
understanding of recent artistic developments that we can begin to make real 
headway with the whole set of issues which are currently discussed under the 
convenient yet mystifying rubric of 'postmodernism'. For it is in Adorno's 
work alone that the 'dual essence' of art as something which is at once socially 
determined and 'autonomous' finds anything approaching an adequate 
theoretical expression.25 
The formal similarities and historical parallels between Greenberg's and 
Adorno's aesthetics have often been noted.26 Nowhere, however, as far as I am 
aware, have they been explored in any detail. There has, though, been a 
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growing tendency to reject Adorno's work as historically outmoded in much 
the same way as Greenberg's work has been attacked since the mid-1960s. 
Implicit in these attacks is the notion that the two theories are involved in 
essentially the same kind of defence of an outmoded modernism. It is this idea 
that I am concerned to oppose. Adorno's aesthetics, I shall suggest, stands to 
Greenberg's as 'traditional' stands to 'critical' theory.28 Its whole rationale is to 
overcome precisely that 'one-sidedness that necessarily arises when limited 
intellectual processes are detached from their matrix in the total activity of 
society', which, according to Horkheimer, is a defining characteristic of all 
'traditional' theory,29 and which is so evident a feature of the traditionalism of 
Greenberg's conception of aesthetic experience. This relation is to be seen at 
its clearest in a comparison of Greenberg's and Adorno's conceptions, first, of 
the idea of the autonomy of the art work; second, of that of its aesthetic 
medium or, in Adorno's case, its 'artistic material'; and finally in their 
respective conceptions of the relationship of modernism to tradition, and to 
the idea of the avant-garde. 
The novelty and formal diversity of current art practices, it will be argued, 
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only pose a problem for the idea of a specifically 'aesthetic' theory of the 
visual arts to the extent to which such a theory fails to take account, at the 
level of its basic categorical structure, of the dual and contradictory essence of 
modern art as at once a historically specific form of critical social practice and a 
realm of 'autonomous' aesthetic objects. To take account of this dual essence, 
however, does not so much require the abandonment of the traditional 
philosophical conception of the 'aesthetic' as a distinct form of experience, as 
its transformative reintegration into the kind of broad socio-historical theory of 
experience represented by the original Frankfurt School project for a 
materialist reunification of philosophy with the empirical sciences. It is the 
beginnings of just such a transformative reintegration of the concept of the 
'aesthetic' into a totalizing (but never totalized) theory of cognitive experience 
- a theory which is at once 'philosophical' and concretely socio-historical in 
intent - which is to be found in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. 
3 GREENBERG AND ADORNO (I): THE AUTONOMY OF THE ART WORK 
The first thing to note about Greenberg's and Adorno's conceptions of 
aesthetic autonomy is that both are essentially historical. The autonomy of the 
art work is understood in both cases as the product of the development of 
society at large. The form of the historical explanation offered in each case, 
however, differs significantly; and it is from this difference that the essential 
difference between their respective conceptions of the autonomy of the art 
work derives. For Greenberg, it is the waning of religion, of 'authority', and of 
tradition, in the sense of a breaking-up of those 'accepted notions upon which 
artists must depend in large part for communication with their audiences', 
which is the main issue.30 For Adorno, on the other hand, it is the specific 
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form of the commodification of art which occurs as a result of the decay of the 
feudal social relations within which the system of artistic production was 
originally embedded, which is of primary significance.31 The two points are 
obviously related, since each describes a different facet of a single historical 
process. But the difference between them is crucial. For whereas Greenberg 
conceives of the autonomy of the art work, from the outset, solely at the level 
of its meaning, Adorno conceives it, at least in its most fundamental sense, at 
the level of those social relations constitutive of 'art' as a social phenomenon. 
Within this analysis, it is the institutionalization of autonomy which makes 
possible and sustains the autonomy of the work at the level of meaning. As a 
result, the sense in which the art work is understood to be 'autonomous' at the 
level of meaning is quite different for Adorno from the way in which it is 
understood by Greenberg. 
The philosophical differentiation of the 'aesthetic' as a distinct sphere of 
value in the work first of Baumgarten and then of Kant was underpinned by 
the development of new forms of social relation in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries - specifically, those associated with the rise of bourgeois 
individualism.32 In the wake of the generalization of the social relations of 
commodity production during the course of the nineteenth century, this 
theoretical specification of the 'aesthetic' became the intellectual basis for the 
institutionalization of art as a specific, and very special kind of, commodity: 
namely, a commodity the exchange-value of which derives, paradoxically, not 
from its usefulness as such (its direct social utility), but rather from the 
specific form of its uselessness: its capacity to sustain 'disinterested' or 
'aesthetic' contemplation. (It is for this reason that the art market is a purely 
speculative one.) Aesthetic theory thereby acquired the function, not only of 
delimiting and theorizing a distinct form of experience (the 'aesthetic'), but 
also of regulating and legitimating the distribution of its privileged objects 
(works of art) through the market, via the dissemination of judgements of 
'taste'.33 It is in the crisis of this function - a crisis precipitated by the growing 
obsolescence of the categories of traditional aesthetics to the comprehension of 
contemporary art - that the social meaning of the current crisis of aesthetic 
theory is to be found. At the heart of this crisis is a fundamental questioning of 
the idea of autonomy which has traditionally provided the philosophical 
groundwork for the category of taste. It is the great value of Adorno's work 
that it allows us to comprehend this crisis not merely as a contingent historical 
phenomenon, but as a necessary stage in what, in typically Hegelian fashion, 
he describes as the 'logical development' of art itself.34 
The key lies in Adorno's conception of art as at once a 'social' and an 
(autonomous) 'aesthetic' phenomenon. It is the contradiction between these 
two aspects of art which constitutes, for him, both the 'dual essence' of all 
modern art and the dynamic underlying its development.35 Furthermore, it is 
the way in which this contradiction is handled, immanently, within the form 
of any particular work which determines both its status as an 'autonomous' 
aesthetic object, and, thereby, its critical capacity. The form of this 
contradiction is as follows. On the one hand, all art is a social product; its 
'autonomy' is always something which is produced and sustained by a specific 
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set of social relations, rather than something which adheres sui generis in the 
aesthetic object itself. On the other hand, the art object none the less posits 
itself as autonomous, absolutely, in so far as it presents itself within the art 
institution as the bearer of a distinctive, 'autonomous' form of experience: the 
'aesthetic'. It is for this reason that, according to Adorno, the social processes 
through which art is produced appear within the work itself through, rather 
than as a supplement to, its aesthetic form. 'The unresolved antagonisms of 
reality reappear in art in the guise of immanent problems of aesthetic form.'36 
It is the way in which these problems are handled, immanently, by the artist, 
which determines whether or not any particular work is to be judged to be 
'authentically' or 'genuinely' autonomous. 
The particular 'antagonisms of reality' which Adorno has in mind in the 
above quotation are primarily those to do with the social consequences of 
commodity production. For him, it is in the form of a contradiction between 
its status as a commodity and its status as an autonomous aesthetic object that 
the contradictory essence of art in capitalist societies manifests itself and works 
itself out. The form taken by this contradiction may be understood as that of a 
contradiction between two different aspects of the commodity form itself: the 
commodity as fetish, and the commodity as a bearer of exchange-value. It is 
the way in which the second of these two aspects (the commodity as a bearer of 
exchange-value) creates the conditions for the subversion of the first (the 
fetishization of the object as a bearer of 'autonomous' value), by reducing the 
value of the aesthetic object to the values of the market - via the pressure 
which is exerted upon the production of art objects by the commercial and 
ideological factors at work in the various networks of their distribution and 
consumption - which, according to Adorno, explains both the restless dynamic 
of the dialectic of aesthetic modernism and the increasingly constitutive 
unintelligibility of 'authentic' late modernist works. For, he argues, the history 
of modernism is, at base, the history of those aesthetic strategies through 
which the work of art (the commodity as fetish) has resisted its own social 
form (the commodity as exchange) in order to be able to continue to reveal, 
through its difference from it, the true meaning of the social order of which it 
is a part, as a form of un-freedom.37 
Once it becomes clear that the aesthetic autonomy of the art work is both 
embedded within and ultimately dependent upon its institutional autonomy, 
but that the specific form of this institutionalization of autonomy (commodifi-
cation) is none the less a growing threat to it, it also becomes clear that the 
autonomous status of any particular work must always be judged in terms of 
its immanent capacity to resist the values of the market through which it must, 
of necessity, nevertheless acquire its social reality. In this regard, Adorno 
argues, any particular work may only be judged to be 'genuinely' or 
'authentically' autonomous to the extent to which the logic of its production 
remains independent of the extra-aesthetic values which will, inevitably, effect 
its reception. This is not, of course, to suggest that its result may not be 
compatible, to some extent, with certain of these values, since this must be the 
case if it is to achieve an independent existence as an art work within the art 
institution. Rather, it is to argue that the art work must none the less actively 
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resist these values from within, if it is to achieve the status of a genuinely 
'autonomous' work. It is the dilemma embodied in this tension that confronts 
all contemporary artists as the problem of aesthetic form. It is in the individual 
artist's struggle with this problem that, in Adorno's phrase, 'social antinomies 
turn into the dialectic of forms'.38 And it is through his or her articulation of 
these antinomies in the language of art (their 'formed presentation') that, he 
argues, the individual artist performs his or her distinctive social role.39 
There are, then, three quite distinct senses implicit within Adorno's work in 
which modern art may be said to be 'autonomous'. It is autonomous: (1) 
theoretically (as the privileged site of a distinct, theoretically specifiable, form 
of experience); (2) socially or institutionally (in so far as the norms and 
practices of the institutions of the art world provide the institutional conditions 
for the realization of this theoretical autonomy in a distinct form of social 
experience: aesthetic experience), and (3) immanently (in so far as the logic of 
production of the individual work actually conforms to that of the production 
of an object capable of producing, within the viewer, an 'autonomous' 
aesthetic experience). 
Within Greenberg's work, the second of these three senses of autonomy is 
noticeably absent; while the third is consequently reduced to the first through 
the idea of specifically aesthetic 'values'; the 'pure' expression of the 
'irreducible elements of experience' through the reduction of the meaning of 
the work to the formal properties of its physical medium.40 It is through this 
move that the idea of autonomy becomes inextricably linked within 
Greenberg's work to that of self-referentiality - an idea which plays no such 
founding role within Adorno's work. Indeed, Adorno's theory actively rejects 
such a role for self-referentiality, since it is the primary function of the idea to 
deny any constitutive role to the 'social' within the 'aesthetic'. 
Greenberg is certainly aware of what he calls the 'umbilical cord of gold' 
which ties the modern artist, however avant-garde, to existing society.41 He 
continues, however, to conceive of this bond in terms of the idea of 
'patronage'. He is thereby able to grasp it solely in its aspect as a form of 
dependency, neglecting the fact that it is through the specific form of this 
dependency (its relation to the market) that modern art became, and continues 
to be, institutionally, and thereby (potentially) immanently, 'autonomous'. It 
is the difference between Adorno's and Greenberg's work on this point which 
structures the difference between their respective conceptions of the autonomy 
immanent in the modernist work itself. 
Whereas for Greenberg the question of autonomy is essentially a question of 
the degree to which a work has 'purified' itself of any aesthetic content 
extrogenous to the formal properties of its particular physical medium (in 
defensive reaction to the erosion of those 'absolute' social values in relation to 
which it had previously defined itself), for Adorno such 'purification' is in 
principle impossible, and in any case, undesirable, since the truth content of 
art - derived from the dialectic of mimesis and rationality constitutive of the 
process of its production - can only, ultimately, be social in form.42 The issue, 
for Adorno, is thus not whether or not (or the extent to which) a work has 
freed itself, absolutely, from the social conditions of its production; but rather, 
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whether or not (or the extent to which) it has succeeded in giving these 
contradictory social conditions an 'authentic' or 'autonomous' aesthetic 
expression. 
The contrast may be illustrated with reference to the aesthetic meaning of 
abstraction, a category which is central to both theories, but which performs a 
quite different role within each of them. For Greenberg, abstraction is an 
essential formal component of autonomy: the means whereby the medium is 
purified of any extrogenous aesthetic content.43 For Adorno, on the other 
hand, it is: (1) a reflection of the growing abstraction characteristic of all social 
relations within capitalist societies (the 'real' abstraction of abstract labour-
time as the unit of social accounting in commodity production, and the 
consequent reification of social relations which follows from it);44 and (2) a 
historically specific aesthetic strategy for the critical expression of such 
reification. (It is for this reason that Adorno describes Beckett as a 'realist'.) 
There is for Adorno no direct, a priori, relationship between abstraction and 
autonomy in art; nor is abstraction to be understood in opposition to the idea 
of social content. Rather, it embodies a distinctive social content of its own. 
The difference between Greenberg's and Adorno's views on this point becomes 
particularly clear when we examine the contrast between their conceptions of 
the 'aesthetic medium' and 'artistic material', respectively. It is this difference 
which, in turn, structures the difference between their respective conceptions 
of the relationship of modernism to tradition. 
4 GREENBERG AND ADORNO (II): ARTISTIC MATERIAL, MODERNISM, 
AND TRADITION 
'The history of avant-garde painting', Greenberg writes in 'Towards a newer 
Laocoon' (1940), 
is that of a progressive surrender to the resistance of its medium. . . . The 
purely plastic or abstract qualities of the work are the only ones that 
count . . . the pristine flatness of the stretched canvas constantly struggles 
to overcome every other element. . . . Purity in art consists in the 
acceptance, willing acceptance, of the limitations of the medium of the 
specific art.45 
It is in the traditionalism of this idea of the purity of the medium of the 
'specific art', set forth in this essay in explicit opposition to that of the 
'confusion' of the arts represented by surrealism, that the fundamental 
traditionalism of Greenberg's whole aesthetics lies. From this idea alone, he 
derives his entire account both of the aesthetic meaning of modernist painting 
and of its essential continuity with tradition. 
The continuity of modernism with tradition lies, according to Greenberg, in 
the continuity of the physical properties of traditional aesthetic media. In the 
absence of aesthetic constraints derived from some direct social function, these 
properties provide art with its 'essential norms or conventions'.46 Modernism, 
he insists: 
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has never meant anything like a break with the past. It may mean a 
devolution, an unravelling of anterior tradition, but it also means its 
continuation. Modern art develops out of the past without gap or break, and 
wherever it ends up it will never stop being intelligible in terms of the 
continuity of art. The making of pictures has been governed, since pictures 
first began to be made, by all the norms I have mentioned . . . . Nothing 
could be further from the authentic art of our time than the idea of a 
rupture of continuity. Art is, among many other things, continuity. Without 
the past of art, and without the need to need to maintain past standards of 
excellence, such a thing as Modernist art would be impossible.47 
It is not hard, in the context of such remarks, to understand the irresistibility 
of the idea of postmodernism; not least, for those modernists for whom 
modernism means, and has always meant, a break with tradition. To be a 
modernist in this sense, in the context of the overarching hegemony of 
Greenberg's conception of modernism within the art institution of the early 
1960s, meant, of necessity, to be a post(Greenbergian)modernist. The more 
strictly theoretical value of the designation 'postmodernism', however, is 
obviously parasitical upon that of the conception of modernism to which it is 
opposed. And in this case, I would suggest, there are grounds for serious 
doubt as to its theoretical usefulness. 
It is in part because of his own insistence upon the continuity of modernism 
and tradition that Adorno's work appears, at first sight, to resemble 
Greenberg's. Yet it is on this very topic that their views stand most starkly 
opposed. For whereas for Greenberg the continuity of modernist with pre-
modernist art resides in the continuity of the 'essential norms or conventions 
of painting' (or of any other traditional medium for that matter), in terms of 
which the work is produced, for Adorno the continuity lies rather in the 
specific form of the rejection of just such norms and conventions by modernist 
works. It is in this sense, above all else, a dialectical continuity. The sense in 
which, for Adorno, the 'new' is that through which the 'old' continues to be 
possible,48 is diametrically opposed to that contained in Greenberg's work. For 
the 'old' (the classical ideal of the organic unity of the aesthetic object, and, 
through it, the social ideal of an autonomous yet 'reconciled' existence), he 
argues, lives on within modernism only negatively; only, that is, through that 
preservation of it as an ideal which persists within the continual negation of its 
actuality by the modernist or 'non-organic' work by virtue of the implicit claim 
to unity which is contained in the very idea of the art work as an autonomous 
object. It is dissonance, not harmony, which is the principle of modernism. 
Indeed, the necessity for such a principled disruption of harmony, created by 
the essentially 'affirmative' role of art within bourgeois society, constitutes, for 
Adorno, both the essential rationale of the modernist work and the origin of its 
deeply problematic relationship to the aesthetic tradition. To the extent to 
which modernism represents a continued and systematic negation of the 
aesthetic ideals of the classical work, whilst none the less remaining dependent 
for its critical effectivity upon that preservation of those ideals implicit in the 
idea of the art work itself, so it must be the task of an aesthetic theory 'to 
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foster the rational and concrete dissolution of conventional aesthetic categories' 
by confronting them with the most recent forms of artistic practice. It cannot, 
however, give them up completely.49 It is just such a rational dissolution of the 
traditionalism of Greenberg's idea of 'the medium of the specific art' which is 
to be found in Adorno's idea of artistic material. 
Just as it is through the idea of the continuity of the most basic physical 
properties of traditional aesthetic media that Greenberg secures his conception 
of the continuity of modernism and tradition, so it is through his conception of 
the constant development of what he calls 'artistic material' that Adorno 
secures his conception of the continual negation performed by modernism 
upon tradition - including those emergent aesthetic traditions derived from 
'old' or 'dead' modernist works themselves: the coagulation of 'modernism' 
into a series of styles. It is through the mediation of the idea of artistic 
material, furthermore, that Adorno conceives of the interpenetration of the 
dialectics of history and of art, and sets out to demonstrate the specific form of 
the presence of the 'social' within the 'aesthetic'. 
Adorno's idea of artistic material refers to 'all that is being formed'. It is 'the 
stuff the artist controls and manipulates: words, colours, sounds - all the way 
up to connections of any kind and to the highly developed methods of 
integration he [sic] might use': 'all that the artist is confronted by, all that he 
must make a decision about, and that includes forms as well'. As such, it is 
'always historical, never natural, irrespective of what artists themselves might 
think' and 'just as dependent upon technical changes as technique is upon 
materials worked upon by it'.50 It is the way in which any particular set of 
materials is treated by the artist which determines the critical efficacy of any 
particular work. This efficacy is, however, constrained by the character of the 
materials used. For it is the progressive, socially determined redundancy of 
particular forms of artistic material as possible media for the expression of 
truth - as a consequence of their neutralization by the history of the reception 
of previous works - which, Adorno argues, drives on the dialectic of aesthetic 
modernism. 
The strictly 'aesthetic' value of any particular artistic means is, then, judged 
to be inseparable from its relation to the wider dialectics of social 
development. It is this idea of modernism as a dynamic of aesthetic 
development, driven on by the wider dialectic of social development, in 
relation to which it stands as at once a constitutive part and a separate, 
'autonomous', reactive sphere - rather than a process the rationale of which 
might be specified in terms of stylistic or merely formal aesthetic elements 
alone - which forms the basis for the continuing application of Adorno's 
aesthetics to the comprehension of so-called 'postmodernist works. The forced 
separation of 'social' from more narrowly 'aesthetic' concerns within 
Greenberg's work, on the other hand, accounts for the inability of his 
aesthetics to begin to comprehend the most important artistic developments of 
the last twenty years. For it is the internalization into the productive logic of 
the art work itself of the recognition of the essentially social character of 
aesthetic autonomy (and the consequent expansion of the means of artistic 
expression which this internalization makes possible) which marks the decisive 
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break between so much recent art and the earlier 'high' modernist works in 
relation to which Greenberg developed his aesthetics. 
It is this recognition, furthermore, which provides the link between the 
aesthetic developments of the last twenty years and what Peter Burger has 
called the 'historical' avant-garde of Dada and surrealism - the rationale of 
which was less to contribute to the dialectic of aesthetic modernism as such, 
than to subvert the autonomy of the art work from within.51 It is, however, in 
the difference of the latest artistic developments from those associated with the 
'historical' avant-garde that the aesthetic specificity of these developments, in 
so far as they have one, must be sought. Since it is the recognition of the 
inevitability of the failure of the historical avant-garde's internal attack upon 
the art institution, and the consequent redeployment of its artistic strategies 
within the sphere of autonomous art as specifically aesthetic strategies (already 
implicit in the tradition of critical aesthetic modernism defended by Adorno) 
which provides the point from which the latest artistic developments start out. 
It is in the combination of these two features - a recognition (1) of the social 
basis of aesthetic autonomy, and (2) of the consequent futility of attempting to 
abolish this autonomy from within the aesthetic sphere itself - that the 
peculiar, ambivalent relationship of the latest, purportedly 'postmodern' 
aesthetic developments to the idea of the avant-garde lies. 
5 MODERNISM , POSTMODERNISM , AND AVANT-GARDE 
The question of the relationship between the categories of 'modernism' and 
the 'avant-garde' is yet another question to which, at first sight, Greenberg and 
Adorno appear to offer similar answers; yet again, their theories are in fact 
quite different. Both tend to identify the ideas of modernism and the avant-
garde; but the determinate content of their respective identifications is quite 
different. Thus, while Greenberg reduces the concept of avant-garde to that of 
his own distinctive concept of modernism, thereby removing its political 
content while at the same time, by association, giving a spurious political 
veneer to the artistic drive towards formal 'purity',52 Adorno expands the 
concept of modernism into that of a perpetual avant-garde, the aesthetic 
rationality of which is to derive, not from some tendentially increasing 
formalism, but from its continual and restless rejection of all outmoded 
aesthetic forms and its constant search for new artistic means through which 
the critical, oppositional expression of the 'unresolved antagonisms of reality' 
might continue to be possible. In the process, it is true, he too deprives the 
concept of the directly political meaning attributed to it by Burger, who uses it 
to refer to a movement the sole rationale of which is to attack the social 
relations of the art institution from within. Yet he does so in order to preserve 
the meaning of that assault within the critical sociality of the modernist work 
itself, in the context of the defeat of the historical avant-garde's project, and its 
reappropriation by the art institution as itself an 'aesthetic' act. It is in the 
continuation of this project, I would suggest, that the real aesthetic meaning of 
those so-called 'postmodernist' works which have achieved an immanent 
aesthetic autonomy is to be found.53 
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Aesthetic modernism is premissed upon the failure of the historical avant-
garde, and the consequent transformation of the idea of the avant-garde into a 
specifically aesthetic category. The idea of postmodernism is premissed upon 
the failure of aesthetic modernism. But has modernism, in any theoretically 
sustainable sense of the term, really failed? (What, indeed, would it mean to 
suggest that it has?) Or is it not the case, more simply, that the inadequacies of 
a specific, restricted, traditionalistic conception of modernism have finally 
been revealed? To the extent to which current proponents of the idea of 
postmodernism in the visual arts have constructed their conception in 
straightforward opposition to Greenbergian modernism, they have not only 
surrendered the history of modernism to the very theory they wish to oppose 
but , as a result, they/have allowed the inadequacies of that theory to infiltrate 
their conceptualization of the aesthetic meaning of the most recent art as well. 
There is a well-known methodological adage, deriving from Marx, to the 
effect that the possibility of insight into the meaning and validity of certain 
general or abstract categories is conditional upon the state of the actual 
historical development of the fields to which these categories pertain.5 4 'This is 
a t ime' , Jameson has recently suggested, 'in which, at least in part owing to 
what is called postmodernism, there seems to be renewed interest in finding 
out what modernism really was . . . and in rethinking that now historical 
phenomenon in new ways. '5 5 This is also, perhaps, a time which is particularly 
propitious for such a rethinking. It would be a pity to pre-empt the results of 
such inquiry by the presumption that modernism is already definitively over. 
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